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From 1867 to 1933 the military came to the aid of the civil power in Canada 
on at least 133 occasions.1 Throughout the period the threat or apprehended 
threat of domestic disorder was the primary justification for both retention 
and expansion of military forces. It was the impetus behind the militia in-
creases in the early 1880's,2 and two decades later Sir Wilfred Laurier cau-
tioned Lord Dundonald: "You must not take the militia seriously, for though 
it is useful for suppressing internal disturbances, it will not be required for 
the defence of the country, as the Monroe doctrine protects us from enemy 
aggression".3 In 1909 Sir Frederick Borden, the Minister of Militia, declared: 
"The reason for the existence of the militia in this country is well understood. 
The principal object is perhaps the upholding of the Civil power in the dif-
ferent parts of the Dominion".4 
Interestingly, this significant role has received little attention from mili-
tary historians. Col. C. F. Hamilton and Lieut. Col. D. J. Goodspeed com-
pletely ignored the theme,5 while G. F. G. Stanley mentioned it only to 
demonstrate that in peacetime the militia "was not a waste of time or money".6 
The few articles that have concentrated on the subject usually leave the im-
pression that the practice, while disliked by the military, was performed with 
patience and tact and was quite successful in restoring or preserving law and 
1 Major JJ.B. Pariseau, Disorders, Strikes and Disasters: Military Aid to the Civil Power in Cana-
da, 1867 -1933 (Ottawa, 1973). Pariseau's list of 132 incidents is the most comprehensive to date. 
One minor episode not mentioned centered on a racial riot in Glace Bay, Cape Breton on 2 Sep-
tember 1918. 
2 W.S. MacNutt, Days of Lome (Fredericton, 1955), pp. 177-178. 
3 G.F.G. Stanley, Canada's Soldiers: The Military History of an Unmilitary People (Toronto, 
1960), p. 294. 
4 Canadian Annual Review of Public Affairs, 1909 (Toronto, 1910), pp. 277-278. 
5 Col. C F . Hamilton,"The Canadian Militia", a series of articles in Canadian Defence Quarterly, 
1928-32; Lt.-Col. DJ . Goodspeed, The Armed Forces of Canada, 1867-1967 (Ottawa, 1967). 
6 Stanley, Canada's Soldiers, p. 291. 
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order.7 Desmond Morton, for example, in a recent study of the period prior 
to 1914, argued that, generally, the "arrival of uniformed, armed troops seems 
to have been sufficient to restore civil authority or to calm the apprehen-
sions of timid magistrates. In many cases the militia only appeared when 
trouble had run its course".8 More recently, Major J. J. B. Pariseàu observed 
that the practice had a salutary effect.9 Such generous assessments call out 
for qualification. In labour disputes, which accounted for almost half of the 
incidents in which military forces were used, the presence of troops may 
not have been viewed as a neutral, stablizing force by other participants. 
If this was the case a reassessment would seem appropriate. With this con-
sideration in mind, this paper will deal with three such incidents, all of which 
occurred in industrial Cape Breton in the 1920's. While they involved re-
latively large troop movements and were instrumental in effecting amend-
ments to the Militia Act, they are not unrepresentative of labour disputes 
during the country's industrial development. 
The year 1919, the year of the "Red Scare", witnessed a great deal of ten-
sion and unrest in Canada. Early in the summer Maj.-Gen. S. C. Mewburn, 
the Minister of Militia, piloted an amendment to the Militia Act through 
Parliament which doubled the authorized ceiling of the permanent force to 
10,000. Mewburn used the traditional argument to bolster his case: the in-
crease might become necessary because "circumstances have arisen through-
out the whole country which seem to indicate an absolute necessity that 
Canada should have some force available for the preservation of law and 
order in this country".10 In spite of an evident post-war reaction against mili-
tary spending, Mewburn's amendment was successful.11 Meanwhile, some 
high ranking military figures were eager to implement compulsory military 
training throughout the country. Brig.-Gen. J. H. MacBrien envisaged a com-
prehensive plan whereby, among other features, boys would commence 
training at six years of age and continue through various levels well into adult-
hood.12 Maj.-Gen. A. G. L. McNaughton, who shared this desire for mili-
tary training, argued that such a scheme would not only provide the men 
needed to quash any insurrection but would assist in removing those very 
7 Major T.V. Scudamore wrote that the practice was "the most unpopular duty that the militia 
can be called upon to perform". "Aid to the Civil Power", Canadian Defence Quarterly, 1932, 
p. 253. See also U. McFadden, "A Civilian's View of the Military", Canadian Defence Quarterly, 
1935, pp. 221-224; R.H. Roy, ". . . in Aid of a Civil Power, 1877", Canadian Army Journal, 1953, 
pp. 61-69. 
8 D. Morton, "Aid to the Civil Power: The Canadian Militia in Support of Social Order, 1867-
1914", Canadian Historical Review, LI, (1970), p. 414. 
9 Pariseàu, Disorders, pp. 20, 38, 48, 50. 
10 Canada, House of Commons, Debates [hereinafter cited as Debates], 1919, pp. 3967-3968. 
11 Ibid., pp. 3966-3982. 
12 J.H. MacBrien, "Memorandum on a Future Military Force for Canada", 1919, Sir Arthur 
Currie Papers, Public Archives of Canada [hereinafter PAC]. 
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dangers by reaching "that element in the country which was most in need 
of education in responsibility and in citizenship".13 Others were more rea-
listic. Maj.-Gen. Sir Eugene Fiset thought the plan but a dream,14 and Sir 
Arthur Currie explained to MacBrien that both Parliament and the public 
"were overwhelming!ly] against universal training at this time. There re-
quires a great deal of educational work to be carried out before any such a 
thing can become a reality. I think it wise not to attempt to force the issue 
at the present time".15 Currie soon moved on to McGill University and Fiset, 
after serving as Deputy Minister of Militia and Defence, retired in the early 
1920's, but MacBrien became Chief of the General Staff and McNaughton 
remained a close associate. Perhaps in part because their desire for universal 
military training had come to naught, MacBrien and McNaughton considered 
the possibility of the domestic overthrow of law and order not only real, 
but the most pressing threat to the country.16 
This mentality was reflected in the proposed re-organization of the mili-
tary forces. As early as August, 1920, Currie had suggested to Arthur Meighen 
that the Department of Militia and Defence and the Naval Service be amal-
gamated into one administrative department. The idea received further 
support when it was learned that the United States was considering a similar 
move.17 Then only a few days after the Liberal electoral victory in December, 
1921, Maj.-Gen. Fiset recommended to Mackenzie King the amalgamation 
not only of the Naval, Air and Militia departments, but of the R.C.M.P. 
as well. Such an arrangement, Fiset argued, would decrease overhead charges 
to a minimum "and the fact that the Royal North West Mounted Police 
will be administered by the same ministerial head would enable a reduction 
in the Permanent Force by an equal number, and enable the Government 
to deal with 'Aid to Civil Powers in Time of Emergency' with a complete 
force under one control".18 A few days later Fiset passed on to King a mem-
orandum by C. G. S. MacBrien along similar lines; in this version the 
R.C.M.P. were envisaged as mobile squadrons closely aligned with the cav-
alry.19 Mackenzie King was receptive. When his first cabinet was formed, 
George P. Graham, whom King had not wanted,20 received the portfolios 
of Militia and Defence, and Naval Services, and early in April 1922, in the 
first session of Parliament, Graham introduced a bill to create the Depart-
ment of National Defence which would include the R.C.M.P. Indeed, accord-
int to Graham, the R.C.M.P. had already been shifted from the Justice De-
13 J. Swettenham, McNaughton (Toronto, 1968), I, p. 183. 
14 J. Eayrs, In Defence of Canada (Toronto, 1964), I, p. 69. 
15 A. Currie to J.H. MacBrien, 12 April 1920, Currie Papers. 
16 Swettenham, McNaughton, I, p. 182. 
17 Eayrs, In Defence, I, pp. 224-225. 
18 E. Fiset to King, 15 December 1921, William Lyon Mackenzie King Papers, PAC. 
19 E. Fiset to King, 19 December 1921, King Papers. 
20 R.M. Dawson, William Lyon Mackenzie King, 1874-1923 (Toronto, 1958), p. 372. 
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partment and for the last few months had been administered by the Depart-
ment of Militia and Defence.21 
Few politicians disagreed with the re-organization of the military forces 
from the viewpoint of efficiency and economy, but strong opposition arose 
to the inclusion of the R.C.M.P. within the proposed Defence Department. 
Arthur Meighen maintained that, if the Mounted Police lost its civilian 
status, it would lose much of its public regard. He envisaged the R.C.M.P., 
which he thought better suited than the militia for preserving law and order, 
as a "mobile police reserve" which could be strategically located in a few 
points in the country, with its services at the disposal of local authorities 
when required.22 General Mewburn, speaking for the Conservatives, also 
argued that the Mounted Police should be left alone. He then added the in-
teresting observation that "We have had troubles in past strikes and that 
sort of thing, and although under the present Militia Act it is within the power 
of a municipality to call upon the militia to turn out for the preservation of 
law and order, that is the very last resort that should be adopted in this coun-
try . . . ."23 Mewburn was followed in the debate by Mackenzie King, who 
brought out that only recently the Mounted Police had been requested by 
municipal authorities in Nova Scotia, but that "the government took the 
position that if we wished to create an industrial disturbance of very serious 
proportions, possibly the best way we could go about it would be to order 
the Mounted Police into those areas". He had, at that time, informed the 
local authorities that "if they were unable to maintain law and order them-
selves, as they were supposed to do", they could call in the militia but he 
assured them that they would be responsible for expenses incurred. King 
felt that "if you once open the door to having the Mounted Police called in 
to aid civil authorities on any occasion when there may be alarm on account 
of industrial disputes, you will in a very short time have the federal govern-
ment discharging a function in the matter of keeping law and order which 
it was never contemplated it should discharge".24 J. S. Woodsworth agreed 
that the R.C.M.P. was hardly an instrument of peace during industrial dis-
putes, and suggested they be confined to the unorganised territories of the 
country. John A. Clark, a West Coast Conservative who had spent twenty 
years in the military and had participated in forces in aid of the civil power, 
spoke out against the use of troops in civil cases because it merely antago-
nized the working class, a prime recruiting area for the military. For him, 
echoing Mewburn, the Mounted Police was the appropriate force, but it 
should not be associated with the Department of National Defence.25 
21 Debates, 1922, p. 734. 
22 Ibid., pp. 665-675. 
23 Ibid., p. 666. 
24 Ibid., p. 667. 
25 Ibid., pp. 670-673. 
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Graham attempted to defend his position by reading statements from the 
provincial authorities. Nova Scotia's reply should be noted. Aware of the 
accessibility of troops under the provisions of the Militia Act, and possibly 
thinking that inclusion of the R.C.M.P. under the Defence Department would 
also mean their availability under the Militia Act, the Nova Scotia govern-
ment stated "that some advantage might be gained if it were able to call 
upon a federal police at any time".26 Eventually, however, the strong oppo-
sition from Conservatives and Progressives alike was successful and the 
R.C.M.P. were excluded from the new Department of National Defence. 
One thing was clear; industrial disturbances were expected. Much of the 
debate had simply been a discussion as to which force could most effec-
tively deal with them. 
These disturbances were not long in coming. Industrial unrest was not 
a new phenomenon in Cape Breton; in 1876, 1882, 1904 and 1909 military 
forces had been sent to Cape Breton from the mainland. But since the war 
two new protagonists had appeared on the scene. One was District 26, United 
Mine Workers of America, representing 12,000 miners in Nova Scotia and 
New Brunswick, and quickly coming under the control of a number of fiery, 
articulate activists, many of whom were, or became publicly avowed com-
munists and members of the Workers Party of Canada. The other was the 
British Empire Steel Corporation (Besco), the largest industrial consortium 
in Canada at the time. Late in 1920 a yearly contract had been signed be-
tween these two bodies. Employees received significant increases, the highest 
wages the men would receive for more than twenty years. Then, in January 
1922, Besco announced a reduction of 35%. Throughout the spring and 
summer of 1922 the industrial situation deteriorated. With a strike in the 
offing, King sent an urgent request to D. D. McKenzie, Solicitor-General 
and Cape Breton M. P., for information on the calling out of the Militia 
and the Mounted Police in aid of the civil power. In reply, McKenzie included 
the appropriate sections of the Militia Act and warned King that the federal 
government " . . . should not be a party to bringing out either the Police 
Force or the Military Force until sufficient pressure to that effect is brought 
to bear, not only by the industrial corporations concerned, but by the civil 
authorities as well".27 He need not have worried; King was quite content 
to maintain a passive role. 
On the morning of 14 August Besco president Roy Wolvin requested im-
mediate military protection from the federal authorities on the grounds 
that the walk-out — scheduled to commence the following day — was to 
include maintenance men, a situation which would lead to deterioration of 
the mines. King replied that invoking military forces in such a situation was 
26 Ibid. 
27 W.H. Measures to D.D. McKenzie, 10 August 1922; D.D. McKenzie to King, 10 August 1922, 
King Papers. 
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not a responsibility of the federal government and enclosed a copy of Mc-
Kenzie^ recent memorandum on the procedures to be followed.28 The strike 
began as planned on 15 August. Concurrent with the strike was an over-
whelming victory for the radicals in the District 26 executive elections. 
Later that day D. W. Morrison, Glace Bay Mayor and Labour M.L.A., issued 
the following statement: 
I have been today twice requested to sign a requisition for troops and 
have refused. I have refused because I felt that there is no need for troops 
in here. There is absolutely no disorder, much less violence. To bring 
armed men into the district under these circumstances is, in my opinion, 
unfortunate and ill-advised and totally unnecessary. 
Today I had the Chief of Police make a careful investigation of the sit-
uation and he has reported to me that there is not the slightest necessity 
for outside interference; he states that there is not even need for special 
police from outside.29 
Others obviously disagreed with Morrison's assessment. That same day 
County Court Judge Duncan Finlayson requisitioned troops under the Mili-
tia Act and the District Officer Commanding, Maj.-Gen. H. C. Thacker, 
immediately forwarded more than 200 Royal Canadian Artillery soldiers 
from Halifax and a 250 man contingent from the Royal 22e in Quebec.30 
The first troop train arrived from Halifax on 16 August and was met at the 
Sydney terminal by rock-wielding strikers and sympathizers. Undeterred, 
the R.C.A. pressed on to Glace Bay, accompanied by Lewis gun detachments 
and five 18-pound field guns.31 
Two arguments were used to justify the military presence and to plead 
for more troops. With maintenance men included among the strikers the 
mines gradually began to accumulate water and since the mines, as the pro-
vincial government frequently pointed out, were owned by the public, they 
had to be protected.32 There was also an irrational fear of the dynamic, out-
spoken, radical union executive, led by J. B. McLachlan and "Red Dan" 
Livingstone. Cape Breton M.P. George Kyte wired to Mackenzie King: 
"People in terror of revolution which radical element threaten. Rush more 
28 R. Wolvin to King, 14 August 1922; King to Wolvin, 15 August 1922, King Papers. 
29 Halifax Herald, 16 August 1922. 
30 Canada was divided into military districts. District 6, with headquarters at Halifax, encom-
passed Nova Scotia and Prince Edward Island. A County Court judge since 1908, Finlayson had 
requisitioned the military during the bitter strike of 1909-10. D. Finlayson to D.O.C., 17 July 
1909, Department of National Defence Records, H.Q. 363-15, vol. 8, PAC. 
31 Sydney Post, 17 August 1922. 
32 Toronto Globe, 16 August 1922. 
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soldiers with all speed".33 Besco president Roy Wolvin maintained that 500 
troops were totally inadequate and that a minimum of 2,000 more was re-
quired immediately. Wolvin added "that if any naval forces are available 
they should be sent to Sydney harbour immediately".34 Similar views were 
expressed by Premier George Murray, Mines Commissioner E. H. Armstrong, 
and W. S. Fielding.35 
Other less influential individuals disagreed with this assessment. The 
Mayor of Glace Bay continued to oppose the dispatch of troops and on 
17 August forwarded the following message to Mackenzie King: "Do not 
consider militia necessary in Glace Bay. No disturbances of any kind. Not 
one arrest. Local authorities are able to cope with conditions. Town will 
repudiate payment of expenses incurred by Militia. Urge that you order 
withdrawal of troops as their presence here is aggravating the situation".36 
In a series of mass meetings in Cape Breton over 1500 "returned men" op-
posed the military presence. Great War Veterans' Associations in Sydney 
Mines and Glace Bay maintained that the appearance of troops "only tends 
to aggravate the situation" and a group of Acadian miners in the area ob-
jected specifically to the presence of the Royal 22e for the same reason. Local 
union officials and some mainland unionists argued that the troops would 
be used to break the strike and that the procedure was productive only of 
harm while Trades and Labour Congress president Tom Moore regarded 
it as a "case of intimidation".37 A few days later the Trades and Labour Con-
gress reiterated its president's position,38 and a Methodist minister in one 
of the mining communities informed King of the serious complications which 
resulted from the new situation, an aspect which generals Thacker and 
McNaughton both recognized and feared.39 Mackenzie King attempted 
to placate those opposed to the military presence by denying that the federal 
government had any responsibility,40 and he quickly persuaded Graham 
to issue a public statement explaining that the government had nothing to 
do with sending the troops. 
On the same day as he made this declaration, however, Graham informed 
33 G.W. Kyte to King, 18 August 1922, King Papers. 
34 R. Wolvin to King, 16 August 1922, King Papers. 
35 E.H. Armstrong to W.S. Fielding, 16 August 1922; Fielding to King, 17 August 1922, King 
Papers. 
36 D.W. Morrison to King, 17 August 1922, King Papers. 
37 Debates, 6 March 1923, p. 867; H. Spracklin, Wm. McDonald to J. Murdock, 16 August 
1922; J. Guest to King, 18 August 1922; DJ. Aucoin et al. to King, 17 August 1922, King Papers. 
38 A.P. Walker to King, 18 August 1922; T. Moore to King, 18 August 1922, King Papers; Labour 
Gazette, September 1922, pp. 968-69. 
39 CA. Munro to King, 17 August 1922, King Papers; Thacker to Ottawa, 19 August 1922; 
McNaughton to Thacker, 23 August 1922, A.G.L. McNaughton Papers, PAC. 
40 King to H. Spracklin, 17 August 1922, King Papers. 
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Thacker that his request for an additional 500 troops was being acted upon.41 
Furthermore, not content with almost 1,000 troops on or enroute to the island, 
the Lieutenant-Governor-in-Council proclaimed Cape Breton County a po-
lice district and approved the raising of 1,000 special police for duty in the 
strike area.42 Since there were no trained and experienced men to act as the 
nucleus of the force, the provincial Mines Commissioner, E. H. Armstrong, 
requested the assistance of the federal government and arrangements, dur-
ing which both King and Sir Lomer Gouin, federal Minister of Justice, were 
consulted, were soon completed.43 Within three days of the initial request 
ten N.C.O.'s from the R.C.M.P. were making fast for the east in their new 
roles as special advisors.44 
Meanwhile, the miners exhibited a high degree of discipline and deter-
mination. When a train carrying the Royal 22e contingent began its short 
ride over coal company tracks from Sydney to the mining town of Dominion, 
it pushed before it an armed gondola which, with its three foot thick pro-
tection of sandbags, could apparently withstand a barrage of 18-pounders. 
Situated on the front corners were Lewis gun crews while the perimeter was 
occupied by dozens of armed soldiers. Undaunted, the strikers twice halted 
this military procession before it reached its destination while a group of 
miners quietly and efficiently searched the train for "scabs".45 In spite of 
the continued lack of violence, on 19 August the District Officer Command-
ing suggested the addition of a large contingent of Mounted Police and the 
use of British battleships then in Newfoundland waters, requesting that they 
be authorized to land in a support role if necessary.56 Not since 1884, when 
a British warship overawed the Indians on the Skeena, had British military 
forces intervened in a domestic dispute.47 Nor was the General finished for 
the day. Through the Senior Naval Officer at Halifax, Canada's two destroy-
ers, the "Patriot" and the "Patrician", received orders to proceed to Sydney 
to render assistance.48 Upon hearing of this latest development, military 
headquarters cancelled the order directing the destroyers to the area and in-
formed General Thacker that naval forces were not to be used "under ex-
isting conditions". General McNaughton, Acting Chief of General Staff 
while MacBrien was on vacation, directed Thacker to begin preparations 
41 King to Beaudry, 17 August 1922, King Papers; Halifax Herald, 18 August 1922. 
42 Canadian Annual Review, 1922 (Toronto, 1923), p. 731. 
43 E.H. Armstrong to L. Gouin, 19 August 1922; J.E. Tremblay "Memorandum", 20 August 
1922; J.C. Tremblay to E.H. Armstrong, 20 August 1922; Armstrong to Tremblay, 21 August 
1922, King Papers. 
44 J.E. Tremblay, "Memorandum", 22 August 1922, King Papers. 
45 Montreal Star, 19 August 1922. 
46 G.O. 6 to Militia Council, 19 August 1922, McNaughton Papers. 
47 Morton, "Aid to the Civil Power, 1867-1914", p. 419, n. 19. 
48 Senior Naval Officer to Ottawa, 19 August 1922, McNaughton Papers. 
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to call out the non-permanent militia to meet any future requirements.49 
The same day that General Thacker attempted to create his amphibious 
force, Premier Murray met with the District 26 executive. An agreement 
was reached whereby maintenance men would return to the pits and, Murray 
informed King, the situation appeared "well in hand".50 King in turn told 
McNaughton that "It would be a great mistake in view of this statement from 
the Premier of the Province to take the extreme kind of action suggested 
by the Group Officer Commanding without first having it endorsed by Prem-
ier Murray himself'.51 The Prime Minister then sent Solicitor-General Mc-
Kenzie to the area as a "special advisor" and Thacker was informed by Mc-
Naughton that if any large number of additional troops were required 
McKenzie and Murray were to be consulted and their endorsement obtained 
"if possible". McNaughton then suggested that the military be brought into 
reserve as soon as the newly created provincial police force was available 
in sufficient numbers. He went on to offer some questionable advice to 
Thacker on the use of the Canadian Navy: "I am informed that such cannot 
be done except by authority of the Governor-General-in-Council, which if 
exercised will involve the assembly of Parliament. My own opinion is, that 
if the situation requires it, they can be used on requisition of the Civil author-
ity in the same way as the military forces. Their entry on the scene at the 
present moment would, however, be difficult to justify, and their presence 
would probably be held to be an undue menace, and in consequence illegal".52 
The following day, General Thacker stated that 1,000 additional troops might 
become necessary and attempted once again to acquire British ships. It is 
also likely that he enticed a few sea planes from Dartmouth because the Air 
Board soon sent a directive forbidding such flights without authorization.53 
Thacker was unperturbed and a few hours later made an unsuccessful at-
tempt to have an airplane squadron dispatched to Cape Breton.54 The Gen-
eral's attempts to solicit both air and naval support are interesting not only 
because almost all the reports — including many of his own — mention that 
the situation remained quiet throughout but because neither force was in-
cluded under the terms of the Militia Act.55 
But the Militia Act was a curious document and many of the people in-
volved were not entirely sure how it operated. While the forces being used 
49 C.G.S. to O.C. 6, 19 August 1922; Naval Headquarters to Halifax, 19 August 1922, McNaugh-
ton Papers. 
50 G.H. Murray to King, 19 August 1922, King Papers; C.B. Wade, "The History of District 26, 
United Mineworkers of America" (unpub. ms., n.d., Public Archives of Nova Scotia). 
51 King to McNaughton, 20 August 1922, McNaughton Papers. 
52 McNaughton to H.C. Thacker, 20 August 1922, McNaughton Papers. 
53 Air Board to Air Station Superintendant, Dartmouth, 21 August 1922, McNaughton Papers. 
54 General "Six" to Militia Council, 21 August 1922, McNaughton Papers. 
55 Lt.-Col. R.J. Odre to C.G.S., "Employment of Naval and Air Forces in Aid of the Civil 
Power", 7 September 1922, McNaughton Papers. 
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were federal forces, the federal government really had little authority in the 
matter once the 'aid to the civil power' clause was invoked. The mainten-
ance of law and order was a local concern. County Court Judge Finlayson 
was the only one who could cancel the requisition and General Thacker 
was the only one who could reduce, but not completely withdraw, the troops. 
And so while Thacker was ordered on 23 August to bring his forces into re-
serve as soon as possible, more Royal Canadian Dragoons arrived in Cape 
Breton by special train, with full equipment and additional horses, on the 
following day.56 
By this time King was being criticized by the Trades and Labour Congress, 
who were holding their annual convention and saw little reason for the pre-
sence of the military in Cape Breton. King made it known he would like the 
troops withdrawn.57 On 26 August, General Thacker passed on King's mes-
sage to Judge Finlayson, but Thacker refused to press Finlayson to cancel 
the requisition and declined to reduce significantly the number of troops 
involved.58 On the same day, August 26, an industrial settlement was reached, 
but it was hardly suggestive of a lasting peace. The union president later 
commented: "The wage schedule was accepted by miners under the muzzle 
of rifles, machine guns and gleaming bayonets with further threatened in-
vasions of troops and marines, with warships standing to. The miners, facing 
hunger, their Dominion and Provincial governments lined up with Besco 
. . . were forced to accept the proposals".59 Nonetheless, a settlement it was. 
The provincial force, which never did manage to send a significant number 
over to the island, disbanded on 28 August. Three days later the R.C.M.P. 
advisors left the area.60 On 1 September requisitions were cancelled and 
the troops began their homeward trek. According to the military authori-
ties, the episode had served only to drain their already meager resources and 
interrupt their summer training.61 
It is difficult to state definitely that the miners would have remained as 
peaceful as they did had the military not been conspicuously present. Yet, 
many people felt that the proximity of the military heightened rather than 
alleviated tensions. That there were no arrests throughout the period of 
occupation was essentially due to the miners themselves. Organized since 
1879, and with activist, strongly supported leadership, the Cape Breton 
miners had a solidarity among Canadian unionists second to none. Military 
intrusions were not new to these communities. Throughout the strike they 
56 McNaughton to Thacker, 23 August 1922; McNaughton to King, 23 August 1922, King Papers. 
57 T.L.C. to King, 22 August 1922; King to T. Moore, 23 August 1922, King Papers. 
58 G.O. 6 to Militia Council, 26 August 1922, King Papers. 
59 Glace Bay Maritime Labour Herald, 23 June 1923. 
60 "Report of the R.C.M.P.", Canada, House of Commons, Sessional Paper 21, LIX, 5, 1923, 
p. 14. 
61 "Report of the Department of National Defence (Militia Service)", Canada, House of Com-
mons, Sessional Paper 17, LX, 4, 1924, p. 12. 
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had massive but orderly parades and they suppressed the accessibility of 
liquor to their members during the dispute.62 Perhaps this very cohesive-
ness was a partial explanation of General Thacker's reactions. Thacker's 
background was very much a military one and there is nothing in it to suggest 
that he was able to acquire a significant understanding of mining communi-
ties in general or Cape Breton miners in particular.63 What was obvious was 
that Thacker was quite prepared to give industrial Cape Breton an appear-
ance not unlike — in the bitter phrase of one Cape Breton veteran in a note 
to King — "an occupied region of Germany during the last war".64 
When a number of politicians, led by J. S. Woodsworth and Arthur 
Meighen, later questioned the necessity for troops in the Cape Breton dis-
pute, the federal government simply repeated that, once properly requested, 
there was no alternative but to forward military forces. Nor did the govern-
ment wish to alter the procedure; when Meighen further inquired if they 
were considering amendments to the Militia Act, he received a negative 
answer.65 The Liberal administration would soon regret its lack of concern. 
On 28 June 1923, after a prolonged period of discussion and the adamant 
refusal of Besco to consider either a wage increase, a decrease of hours, 
or union recognition, the Sydney steelworkers went on strike.66 Within 
hours Judge Finlayson again requisitioned the military "in anticipation of 
disorders that might arise".67 Thacker complied immediately. 
Unlike the miners, the steelworkers had only a weak organization. The 
first evening of the strike a confrontation between strikers and corporation 
representatives occurred at one of the plant gates. The pattern was repeated 
the following evening. One local paper observed: "The crowd seemed to 
be aware that soldiers were on their way to Sydney and seemed determined 
to make as much trouble as possible in the few hours left before the troops 
would arrive".68 Early in the morning of 30 June, the rumble of a troop train 
was again heard in the vicinity of Sydney. Once again the armoured gondola, 
62 J. Moffatt to F.A. Acland, 17 August 1922; C.A. Munro to King, 28 August 1922, King Papers. 
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65 Debates, 1923, pp. 863-899. 
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piled high with sand bags and bristling with machine guns, appeared.69 These 
forces were the first of more than 1,150 troops to be sent to the island by 
General Thacker. A few hours later provincial police were requested. That 
evening, the pattern of conflict continued. The troops, stationed just out-
side the plant gate, fired over the heads of the angry crowd as they retreated 
out of range of the rocks.70 This action was met by shouts of defiance and 
the crowd apparently did not disperse until a machine gun was placed in 
position and preparation was made to fire.71 The following morning the pro-
vincial force, now known as "Armstrong's Army", arrived.72 Before the day 
was complete this force had made a major contribution to Cape Breton's 
"Bloody Sunday". According to one reporter, "Mounted police charges on 
• the mob, police raids, and steel-hatted soldiers advancing with fixed bayo-
nets, lent a war-like and spectacular touch to the strenuous scenes [until] 
. . . the soldiers and police called it a day and retired behind their stockades".73 
This report neglected to mention that some of the recipients of the police 
charge were returning from evening church services and included women 
and children.74 But as the Liberal Record observed: "Stamping out lawless 
violence is not apt to be a gentle process".75 
After this display of authority, confrontations were rare. The main reason 
was the determination of the provincial police, supported by the military, 
to prevent any gatherings, including picketing. Meetings by militant unionists 
were regarded as unlawful assemblies and subject to visitations by both 
provincial and military forces.76 As in 1922, military outfits with a high per-
centage of mounted troops, such as the Royal Canadian Horse Artillery and 
the Royal Canadian Dragoons, were very much in evidence.77 Unlike 1922, 
however, there is no evidence of requests for naval or air forces. 
The entire issue was soon hurled into the middle of the national political 
arena. The Cape Breton miners, 8,500 strong, walked out in protest against 
the authorities' measures on 3 July. This prompted the Record to declare 
the whole affair a "miniature rebellion".78 Sympathetic strikes soon broke 
out in Pictou, Nova Scotia, and in the coal fields of Alberta; throughout 
the country opposition to the use of the military became intense. The Prime 
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70 Robertson Report, p. 14; Labour Gazette, August 1923, p. 869. 
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Minister was worried by "this very serious aspect of the situation" as both 
he and Labour Minister James Murdock were bombarded with telegrams 
of protest and warnings that they would be held responsible.79 Organized 
labour was completely unimpressed with the federal government's explana-
tion that the military presence in Cape Breton was not a responsibility of the 
federal authorities.80 King then turned to his Acting Minister of National 
Defence, E.M. Macdonald,81 and to Premier Armstrong, and declared that 
the workmen were "held in subjection by the presence of armed forces" 
which "seems to have exceeded all bounds of necessity or prudence". While 
requesting them to convey his feelings on the matter to Judge Finlayson, 
Mackenzie King also suggested that Armstrong might be able to substitute 
a special provincial force for the militia units.82 Duncan Finlayson proved 
adamant. The judge stated that the troops would remain until he decided 
otherwise and that such a time had not yet arrived.83 This prompted the feder-
al authorities to seek a way around the impasse. It proved unfruitful; Finlay-
son was correct, although the departments of Justice and Defence were not 
in agreement in their interpretations of the Militia Act.84 The troops re-
mained. 
Then, on 11 July, Mackenzie King admitted for the first time that the 
Militia Act needed amending. The tone of the statement, included in a reply 
to a protest by T.L.C. president Tom Moore, is suggestive: "The presence 
of troops in Cape Breton to the numbers there at the present time, and under 
circumstances which appear to render it most doubtful that the expense 
incidental thereto will be borne, as the law clearly contemplates, by the 
municipalities concerned, render it apparent that there is need for revision 
of the statute respecting the calling out of the militia in aid of the civil 
power".85 Meanwhile, although E.M. Macdonald had assured King and 
James Murdock on 8 July that military forces from Western Canada would 
not be sent to Cape Breton, an assurance which the Labour Minister eagerly 
utilized in an attempt to placate Canadian labour leaders, troops continued 
to arrive from Cape Hughes, Manitoba as late as 12 July.86 This prompted 
a bitter note from Labour Minister Murdock to Acting Defence Minister 
Macdonald and a public statement by the former suggesting that the leading 
79 King to E.M. Macdonald, 7 July 1923, King Papers. 
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provincial Liberals "make an effort to find out more about the human side 
of the situation".87 But Murdock's methods proved far more effective in 
creating antagonism within the Liberal party than in returning the troops to 
their camps. Eventually on 17 July U.M.W. International president John 
L. Lewis intervened, deposed the radical district executive and, unconstitu-
tionally,88 appointed a provisional executive. By 24 July the miners decided 
to return to work. The steelworkers, with no chance of success, gamely 
limped on to 31 July. Troops began departing by 28 July and all were back 
on the mainland by 15 August. 
Once again, it is difficult to assess just how effective the military presence 
was as a stabilizing force. Throughout the country organized labour was 
antagonized and a few sympathetic strikes developed. For various reasons 
the Cape Breton situation was more volatile than that of the previous year. 
There had been confusion and disagreement between the departments 
of Justice and National Defence regarding the Militia Act.89 Similar, if more 
intense, feelings existed within the federal government. Unlike the miners, 
the steelworkers had no effective union organization and their discipline 
was weak. Nonetheless, one report did suggest that the knowledge that 
troops had been requisitioned had actually increased the violence. After 
the first few days there were violent outbursts but they were generally 
initiated by the provincial police force. The miners did not enter the fray 
until the provincial and military forces had entered the area. Indeed it had 
been the presence and actions of these forces which had prompted the 
walkout by the miners. When the dust had settled ten people were convicted 
of rioting or unlawful assembly — a small percentage of 10,000 strikers.90 
It was time for a Royal Commission to investigate industrial unrest in 
Cape Breton. The chairman, appointed by the federal government, was 
Dr. J.W. Robertson, president of the Canadian Red Cross Society. Prior 
to the commencement of the Committee's work the Prime Minister wrote 
a "strictly confidential" letter to Robertson suggesting some aspects he 
could investigate carefully: 
I have come to feel that the law as it stands governing the calling out 
of the troops in aid of the civil power at times of industrial unrest needs to 
be amended so as to prevent corporations from taking advantage of the 
powers which can be exercised, through any Judge to whom appeal may 
be made, where civil authorities themselves are unwilling to take the 
initiative required . . . . 
87 J. Murdock to E.M. Macdonald, 12 July 1923, King Papers; Canadian Press Clipping, 12 July 
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From what I saw last year of the telegrams . . . the effort then made not 
only to call out the militia, but to bring into play the naval service and 
the air forces as well — has led me to see how dangerous it is to the whole 
national situation that a power of this kind should be given to a few men 
without due restraints in the way of a control from a responsible source.91 
A few months later General MacBrien, faced with another decrease in finan-
cial allocations to the military and apparently unaware of the highly variable 
winds by which Mackenzie King tacked through political seas, pointed out 
that aid to the civil power was one of the three main functions of the per-
manent force. Oblivious to the furor of the previous summer, MacBrien 
argued that: 
One of the most serious threats to the reduction of the Permanent Force 
is that the Department of Defence will be unable to supply troops for aid 
to the Civil Power in the same measure as has been done in the past. Thus 
the government will be left without any force with which to maintain law 
and order in strike areas or in the event of any other national emergency 
arising. 
When it is remembered that during the recent strike in Cape Breton 
last summer, practically all the combatant troops were collected at Sidney 
[sic] and brought from points as distant as Winnipeg, and even then an 
adequate number was not available, very serious consideration should be 
given before reducing the already limited numbers available.92 
The argument proved unconvincing and actual troop strength continued to 
decrease.93 
Early in 1924 the Robertson Commission completed its study on Cape 
Breton unrest. While not a particularly perceptive document it did, as King 
had suggested, recommend changes in the Militia Act.94 After considering 
them for four months, the government, in early June, prepared to introduce 
what were essentially the Commission's recommendations. Henceforth, the 
provincial Attorney-General would, upon receiving notification from a super-
ior or district County Court judge and satisfied that such a force was required, 
sign a requisition. The District Officer Commanding would then be required 
to call out the permanent troops or such portion as the D.O.C. considered 
necessary. The Attorney-General would be required to initiate an inquiry 
91 King to J.W. Robertson, 21 September 1923, King Papers. 
92 J.H. MacBrien to Minister, 16 February 1924, McNaughton Papers. 
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within seven days, with the report to be forwarded to the Secretary of State. 
The province would be responsible for the costs and, if necessary, the federal 
government would be able to retain any unpaid balance from the annual 
grant to the appropriate province. The Attorney-General would be respon-
sible for recalling the troops.95 The only differences between the Commission 
recommendations and the proposed legislation were the explicit statement 
of provincial financial responsibility and the method by which the federal 
authorities could, if necessary, acquire the money. 
The proposed legislation brought a strong reaction from Nova Scotia Liber-
als in both Halifax and Ottawa. All but one of the Nova Scotian Liberals 
in Parliament opposed the legislation; the exception was E.M. Macdonald 
who, as Minister of National Defence, introduced the legislation. The pro-
vincial administration was equally adamant, with Premier Armstrong tersely 
arguing that the maintenance of peace, order, and good government was 
a "peculiar obligation" of the federal government and Provincial Secretary 
Cameron contending that, because the doctrines proclaimed by the radicals 
threatened the 'constitution', the costs should be absorbed by the nation.96 
Their concern for the nation's continued existence was doubtless intensified 
by their awareness of their new financial responsibilities. 
In the federal House of Commons, E.M. Macdonald defended the changes, 
and set the theme for much of the debate which ensued, by referring to pecu-
niary considerations. He noted that on the 59 occasions in the last fifty years 
on which troops were invoked in aid of the civil power, only $40,291 of the 
$556,291 spent had been collected by the federal government. The two recent 
episodes had cost $162,916 —not including pay and allowances — and the 
municipalities, true to their word, had refused to pay.97 The use of the mili-
tary was becoming expensive. But there were numerous objections to the 
amendments. Liberal whip and Cape Breton M.P. George Kyte echoed the 
provincial Liberals and argued that, as most of the disputes were in the coal 
fields and thus of national concern, the province should not be held respon-
sible for the costs. William Irvine, the Labour M.P. from Calgary, had other 
criticisms. He maintained that judges were rather ignorant of industrial con-
ditions and should be the last persons invested with the authority to call 
out the troops. He was also dissatisfied with the government for not including 
any additional regulations on the amount of military force which could be 
invoked. In the light of King's earlier comments to J.W. Robertson, this omis-
sion was curious and was immediately subjected to the penetrating glance 
of Arthur Meighen. The Conservative leader strongly objected to the vast 
discretionary power wielded by the District Officer Commanding. Relying 
less on the Robertson Report than on the realities of 1923, Meighen asked 
95 Debates, 1924, p. 2862. 
% Armstrong to King, 4 June 1924; D.A. Cameron to King, 6 June 1924, King Papers. 
97 Debates, 1924, pp. 2862-2872. 
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what would happen if the Cape Breton experience occurred again and, with 
the majority of Canadian troops in the area, the Saskatchewan farmers be-
came aroused or the Winnepeg situation was repeated? Such a concentration 
of military forces, he maintained, "would leave the rest of the country utterly 
stripped, and the government would stand stark and helpless, unable to do 
anything". For Meighen it was a "preposterous condition of affairs".98 
Meighen hammered constantly on this theme and eventually his argument 
had some effect. Before final reading, Macdonald offered another change 
whereby the D.O.C. would be required to contact the Adjutant-General, 
before going beyond his military district for additional forces and the Adju-
tant-General, in turn, would decide from which locations these forces would 
come. Unsatisfied, Meighen persisted, and finally Macdonald included a 
provision giving the Adjutant-General full discretionary powers concerning 
the use of troops from outside any military district." In effect, this meant 
that if General Thacker, or any other District Officer Commanding, wished 
to bring in forces from outside his own military district the Adjutant-General 
would make the decision. 
Aside from the financial alterations, the only changes in the Militia Act 
originally proposed by the King government were to abandon the initial role 
of the mayor or warden and to insert the Attorney-General between the judge 
and the military.100 Macdonald was rather vague about the reasons for the 
deletion of the local, elected representatives from the procedure.101 That 
municipalities were to be no longer held responsible for expenses was doubt-
less a factor, but it should be remembered that in the recent incidents some 
local elected authorities had declined to call out the troops and this was a 
period of intense labour involvement in local political activity with labour 
councilmen and mayors quite evident in the Cape Breton industrial towns. 
Whatever the reasons behind the alterations, the amendments, as King pri-
vately assured Premier Armstrong, were not very significant,102 although 
they were satisfactory to the T.L.C. delegation, who in their annual pilgrim-
age to Parliament in January 1925 deleted their previously expressed desire 
for Militia Act amendments.103 
The autumn and winter of 1924-25 were sluggish ones for the island's 
steel and coal industry with direct and dire consequences for the workers and 
their families. Employment in the mines was sparse and those who were 
working were managing one or two shifts a week. By mid-February a Glace 
98 Debates, 1924, pp. 2872-2878. 
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Bay health officer reported that 2,000 idle miners and their families were "on 
the verge of starvation".104 The situation became more desperate when Besco 
abruptly terminated all credit at its company stores in early March. Faced 
with little work and less food, the miners reluctantly went on strike a few 
days later. By April many families were dependent on donations from across 
the country merely to remain alive.105 In spite of frequent prodding by J.S. 
Woods worth, Agnes Macphail, Arthur Meighen and others, the federal 
government refused to intervene. Assistance of this type was not a federal 
responsibility and Mackenzie King maintained he would only intervene upon 
the request of the Armstrong government.106 Armstrong, however, declined 
to seek relief assistance.107 One prominent Halifax Conservative privately 
declared: "It looks as if governments are trying to create such a situation that 
there will be riots and bloodshed with the result that troops will be rushed 
in and men forced to return to pits".108 
Finally on 11 June 1925 a clash between miners and Besco policemen at 
New Waterford resulted in the shooting death of one miner and the serious 
wounding of another. Five others were hospitalized, as were thirty policemen. 
The provincial police force, which had been secretly organizing for a week,109 
was immediately sent from Halifax to Cape Breton. Again Judge Finlayson 
was ready, and quickly sent a request for troops to the Attorney-General, 
WJ. O'Hearn.110 The latter contacted General Thacker and, for the third 
time in four years, military forces began pouring into the area. The feelings 
of many were expressed by one western trades council in a bitter note to 
Mackenzie King: "It is our earnest hope that they will take sufficient feed 
with them as they will find little or none on their arrival. It would be a national 
catastrophe if troops on arrival suffered any hardships through insufficient 
nourishment".111 Soon there were an estimated 2,000 troops on their way to 
Cape Breton.112 General Thacker quickly used up all available district troops 
but a message to the Adjutant-General, which included the unconfirmed re-
port that the workers were in possession of a machine gun and that while 
there was no ammunition for it a man had apparently left Sydney to obtain 
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some, soon made short shift of the previous year's amendment prompted by 
Meighen's criticisms.113 In Parliament, Defence Minister Macdonald simply 
explained that "Under the law . . . once the Attorney-general of a province 
requests the military forces . . . they are bound to be sent there. No discretion 
is left".114 It was a familiar response. 
There was a great deal of violence. What is interesting is not that it occurred 
but that it continued, in spite of the military presence. The first fire occurred 
on 11 June, several hours after the first troops had been requested. Raiding, 
looting and burning continued throughout the month of June.115 The destruc-
tion was not wanton. Most of the company stores were looted and several 
were burned to the ground. Similar fate befell Besco warehouses, a coal 
bankhead, and two antiquated wash houses of which the miners had com-
plained for years. In all, there were twenty-two fires, the last occurring on 
30 June. Damages were between 500,000 and 1,000,000 dollars.116 Eventually, 
quiet returned and the troops departed on 15 August. Only one person was 
ever charged as a result of the excesses of June, 1925: the Besco policeman 
accused of killing William Davis, the deceased miner. He was acquitted. 
The role of the military in the Cape Breton industrial disputes of the 1920's 
does not easily fit into the pattern detected by previous historians. The ab-
sence of violence in 1922 was probably attributable more to the organization 
and solidarity of the miners than it was to the military presence. Spokesmen 
for the miners repeatedly stated that they viewed the dispatch of troops as 
a method of intimidation which intensified feelings, an interpretation shared, 
or recognized, by other individuals, not all of whom were labour sympathizers. 
With the forceful appearance of the provincial police the situation was altered 
somewhat the following year. It can be argued that the military presence in 
this instance did prevent even worse confrontations between the provincial 
force and the workers. But the roles of the federal and provincial contingents 
can not easily be separated. The miners went on strike, significantly broaden-
ing the dispute, because of the presence of both forces. The striking steel-
workers and miners viewed the military presence as an intimidating one, 
a sentiment shared by highly vocal elements of organized labour throughout 
the country. Even Mackenzie King and James Murdock saw the troops as 
a force for "subjection" and an "unfair and indecent attempt to cow the men 
into submission".117 Also, the provincial force was not on a permanent basis 
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but was created to meet a particular situation and then disbanded. This the 
provincial authorities did at least four times during the period. Thus it was 
hardly a highly disciplined, stable force and it is at least possible that its 
members' enthusiasm and willingness to engage in direct, physical confronta-
tions were increased by the knowledge that Canada's permanent troops were 
always close at hand. This evident facility in invoking the military may be 
a partial explanation of Besco's non-conciliatory policy, a policy detected 
in the corporation's contract negotiations throughout the period.118 The 
quick and repeated requisitions for the military doubtless increased the bitter-
ness of many workingmen in the area and gave those radicals committed to 
class warfare an excellent platform. Thus, the very legislation which was 
relied on so frequently in industrial disputes may have contributed to an 
increase in both the number of the incidents and the intensity of the conflict. 
When violence did arrive on a large scale, as it assuredly did in June 1925, 
a military force twice as large as the earlier contingents did not halt the 
miners from expressing their anger and despair. The apparent willingness 
of both the federal and provincial governments to ignore the acute distress, 
coupled with the recurring appearance of federal troops, doubtless contribut-
ed to these feelings. 
Throughout the period neither the provincial nor the federal government 
exhibited a strong desire to alleviate the immediate or the fundamental causes 
for the frequent use of the military in aid of the civil power. The provincial 
administration, while hardly opposed to the use of troops, was strongly, and 
unsuccessfully, opposed to acquiring legal or financial responsibility. The 
federal government, under Mackenzie King, maintained a constitutional 
aloofness. Their concern, it became apparent, was less with limiting a power 
of this kind "to a few men without due restraints" than it was with correcting 
a financial situation which had proved quite costly to the federal government. 
After an extended controversy, Mackenzie King deducted $133,116.73 from 
Nova Scotia's subsidy in 1929.119 It was payment for the cost of the troops 
in 1925, but that sum was only a small fraction of the total costs resulting from 
the disputes. The effects of the disruption of production, the bitterness, 
deprivation and despair which accompanied these disputes were deep, lasting 
and incalculable. The steel workers acquired a company union after their 
defeat in 1923 and did not become more effectively organized until the late 
1930's, while the miners did not regain the elusive wage scale of 1920 until 
World War II. Major-General H.C. Thacker was less unfortunate; he became 
Chief of the General Staff in 1927. 
118 Miners' perceptions of this attitude are expressed throughout the Evidence Presented Before 
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